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Ravazzini: Drug Tax

SUMMARY

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. KURTH
RANCH: THE EXPANSION OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY JURISPRUDENCE INTO CIVIL
TAX PROCEEDINGS

From the beginning of our government, the
courts have sustained taxes although imposed
with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior
ends which, considered apart, were beyond the
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize
by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment. l

[T]he decisional law in the [double jeopardy]
area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not
fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator. 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Before its decision in Department of Revenue v. Kurth

1. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950) (upholding the Marihuana
Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now repealed (last codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741
(1964», which imposed a federal tax on marijuana at the rate of $100-per-ounce,
against a constitutional challenge that the tax was a penalty, rather than a true
tax) (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934) (upholding against
a due process challenge a steep excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on
processors of oleomargarine during the Great Depression».
.
2. Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
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Ranch,S the United States Supreme Court had never subjected
a tax statute to double jeopardy scrutiny.4 In Kurth Ranch,
the Supreme Court held that Montana's tax on the possession
of illegal drugs, assessed after the state had imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct, violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against successive punishments for the same
offense. s The Court stated that the Montana Dangerous Drug
Tax6 was not the kind of civil sanction that may follow the
first punishment of a criminal offense. 7 Moreover, the Court
held that the civil proceeding Montana initiated to collect the
tax was the "functional equivalent of a successive criminal
prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time"
for the same offense. s
This summary first provides a brief overview of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 9 The overview will be
followed by an analysis of the Supreme Court's expansion of
double jeopardy application in United States v. Halper. lo The

3. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (per
Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.; dissenting
opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.).
4. See id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1945·46 &
n.16. The Kurth Ranch Court explained:
Although we have never held that a tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, we have assumed that one might. In
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), for example,
this Court considered a Revenue Act provision requiring
the taxpayer to pay an additional 50 percent of the total
amount of any deficiency due to fraud with an intent to
evade the tax. The Court assumed such a penalty could
trigger double jeopardy protection if it were intended for
punishment, but it nevertheless held that the statute was
constitutional because the 50 percent addition to the tax
was remedial, not punitive. Id., at 398-405. Although the
penalty at issue in Mitchell is arguably better characterized as a sanction for fraud than a tax, the Court . . .
[made) nothing of the potential import of the distinction.
Id.
5. Id. at 1948.
6. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987». The Kurth Ranch Court's opinion
refers only to the 1987 edition of the Montana Code, the version in effect at the
time of the Kurths' arrest.
7. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding for the first time that a civil fine constitutes
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summary will then briefly analyze Montana's Dangerous Drug
Tax Act. ll Finally, the summary will discuss the majority's
reasoning in Kurth Ranch, and examine the three separate
dissenting opinions. 12
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The extended Kurth family owned a ranch in Central
Montana. 13 The Kurths' business involved livestock, mixed
grain, and marijuana. 14 Their family business grew into the
largest known marijuana farming operation in the State of
Montana. 15 In October 1987, Montana law enforcement officers raided the ranch, arrested the Kurths, and confiscated
2,155 marijuana plants, 1,811 ounces of harvested marijuana,
hash tar and hash oil, equipment, and paraphernalia. 16 The
Kurths were convicted and sentenced on various state drug
charges. 17
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act imposes a tax "on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs" on each individual
arrested for such possession and storage. 18 In the case of marpunishment violative of the double jeopardy clause).
11. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 §§ 15-25-101 to
-123.
12. Kurth Ranch. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at
1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (1994).
14. Id.
15. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
16. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 & n.7, 1946 n.17. See also id. at 1952
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
17. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 64-65. All six respondents pleaded guilty
in the Montana District Court to conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to
sell, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (1987); additionally, respondent Richard Kurth
was charged with criminal sale of dangerous drugs (marijuana), id. § 45-4-101;
criminal possession of a dangerous drug (marijuana) with the intent to sell, id. §
45-9-103; solicitation to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous
drug (marijuana) with intent to sell, id. § 45-4-101; and criminal possession of a
dangerous drug (hashish), id. § 45-9-102. In re Kurth Ranch. 145 B.R. at 64-65.
Additionally, in a separate proceeding, the county attorney filed a civil forfeiture action seeking recovery of cash and equipment used in the marijuana operation. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. The respondents settled the forfeiture
action with an agreement to forfeit $18,016.83 in cash and various items of equipment. Id. The confiscated drugs were not involved in the forfeiture action because
law enforcement agents destroyed them after inventory. Id.
18. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 15-25-111(1).
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ijuana, the tax is ten percent of the market value of the
drugs 19 or $100 per ounce, whichever is greater. 20 Pursuant
to the Act, the Montana Department of Revenue attempted to
collect $900,000 in taxes 21 on the marijuana plants,22 harvested marijuana,23 hash tar and hash Oil,24 plus interest
and penalties. 25 The Revenue Department initiated the civil
tax proceeding about six weeks after the start of the criminal
prosecution. 26
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, instituted by the
Kurths after the State's attempt to collect tax and forfeiture
proceeds,27 the Kurths objected to the Revenue Department's
A "dangerous drug" is defined as a "drug, substance, or immediate precursor" in
Schedules I through V. See § 15-25-102(1); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-32-101(6), 5032-222, 50-32-224, 50-32-226, 50-32-229, 50-32-232 (1993). "Although the tax return
must be filed within 72 hours of arrest, imposition of the tax is not contingent
upon criminal conviction nor even pursuit of a criminal prosecution." The Supreme
Court, 1994 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure: Double Jeopardy- Tax on the
Possession of Illegal Drugs, 108 HARv. L. REv. 139, 174 n.25 (1994).
19. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 15-25-111(2)(a).
Market value is determined by the Department of Revenue. Id. § 15-25-102(2).
20. [d. § 15-25-111(2)(a), (b)(i). Hashish is taxed at the greater of market value
or $250 per ounce. [d. § 15-25-111(2)(a), (b)(ii).
21. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 68. This figure was judicially reduced by
the bankruptcy court to approximately $181,000 on state constitutional grounds.
Id.
22. Marijuana is defined as "all plant material from the genus cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or seeds of the genus capable of germination."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(17) (1993).
23. [d.
24. Hashish is defined as "the mechanically processed or extracted plant material that contains tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and is composed of resin from the
cannabis plant." [d. § -101(14).
25. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43. The civil tax proceeding was automatically stayed in september 1988 when the Kurths petitioned for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. [d. at 1943; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 &
Supp. V).
26. United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(discussing Kurth Ranch). The Kurth Ranch Court stated that "[this case) involves
separate sanctions imposed in successive proceedings." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at
1947 n.21. This amounts to a holding that a civil action and a criminal prosecution directed to the same offense, even when filed close in time, constitute two
proceedings for double jeopardy purposes when pursued in separate cases and
concluded at different times. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1304 (holding that civil
forfeiture is punishment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. Torres, 28
F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a nonpunitive civil proceeding did
not bar a subsequent prison sentence for double jeopardy purposes).
27. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43. The Kurths settled the civil forfeiture proceeding with an agreement to forfeit cash and items of equipment. [d.
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claim for unpaid drug taxes and challenged the constitutionality of Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act. 2B The Kurths argued, and the bankruptcy court agreed, that the tax constituted a second punishment for the same offense in violation of the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 29 The state countered that the tax was not a penalty because it was designed to
recover law enforcement costs and was therefore remedia1. 30
Relying primarily on United States v. Halper,31 the bankruptcy court rejected the State's argument, noting that the government failed to provide an accounting of the actual damages or
costs it incurred. 32 More importantly, the court reasoned, the
punitive character of the tax was evident because the Act promoted the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and
deterrence. 33 The district court concurred with the bankruptcy
court, holding that the dangerous drug tax constituted a second punishment for the same criminal conduct. 34
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, largely basing its conclusion on the
state's failure to provide an accounting to justify the tax. 35
However, the court refused to hold the tax unconstitutional on
its face, instead holding it unconstitutional as applied against
the Kurths. 36 Looking first to Halper, the court determined
that a disproportionately large civil penalty can be punitive for
double jeopardy purposes. 37 Although Halper involved a civil
penalty rather than a tax, the court of appeals found no distinction between a fine and the tax at issue in Kurth Ranch. 3s
The court determined that the main inquiry under Halper's
double jeopardy analysis was whether the sanction imposed
was rationally related to the damages the government suf-

28. See In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 74.
31. 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding for the first time that a civil fine constitutes
punishment violative of the double jeopardy clause).
32. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 75.
33. Id. at 75-76.
34. In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21133, at
*13 (D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991).
35. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1311.
38. See id.
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fered. 39 The court of appeals concluded that the Kurths were
entitled to an accounting to determine if the Montana tax
constituted an impermissible second punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 4o Due to the state's failure to offer
any such evidence, the court held the tax unconstitutional as
applied to the Kurths. 41
While Kurth Ranch was pending on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court, in
Sorenson v. State Dep't of Revenue,42 reversed two lower state
court decisions that held that the Dangerous Drug Tax was a
form of double jeopardy.43 The Sorenson court found that the
legislature had intended to establish a civil, not a criminal,
penalty and that the tax had a remedial purpose in addition to
promoting retribution and deterrence. 44 Notably, the court
found Halper not controlling because that decision involved a
civil penalty, not a tax. 45 The Sorenson court concluded that
the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax was not excessive and that
a tax, unlike a civil sanction, requires no proof of the remedial
costs incurred by the government. 46

39.Id.
40. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at 1312.
41. Id.
42. 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 32-33. The Sorenson court stated:
Halper involved a civil sanction and a fixed penalty per
offense which was not based on remedial costs. As mentioned, the penalty was $2,000 for each event regardless
of how small the dollar amount was in terms of cost to
the government. In contrast, the Montana Dangerous
Drug Tax is an excise tax based on the quantity of drugs
in the taxpayer's possession.
Id. at 33.
46. Id. at 33. The Sorenson court announced:
We note that both District Courts held· the tax was excessive and punitive, not remedial, because the DOR failed
to provide a summation of the costs of prosecution and
societal costs of drug use. However, unlike the civil sanction in Halper where such proof may be required, a tax
requires no proof of remedial costs on the part of the
state. Commonwealth Edison Co. u. State of Montana
(1980), 189 Mont. 191, 615 P.2d 847. In Commonwealth
this Court held that the state is not required to defend
the validity of an excise tax by offering a summation of
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The Montana Supreme Court decision was directly at odds
with the Ninth Circuit decision. Consequently, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 47
III. BACKGROUND
A.

THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb .... "48 Although the text mentions
only harms to "life or limb," it is well settled that the Fifth
Amendment also covers monetary penalties and imprisonment. 49 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three
possible actions: a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal;50 a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction;51 and multiple punishments for the same offense. 52 The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 53
The Clause does not prohibit multiple punishm"ents imposed in a single proceeding whether these punishments be a
combination of prison plus a fine, consecutive terms of prison,
or prison plus a forfeiture. 54 Because a legislature may authorize multiple punishments under separate statutes for a single
course of conduct, the multiple-punishment issue in the context
of a single proceeding focuses solely on ensuring that the total
punishment does not exceed legislative authorization. 55 Thus,
the costs of governmental benefits. Commonwealth, 189
Mont. at 207, 615 P.2d at 855·856.

1d.
47. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 436 (1989); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 162, 173·176 (1874).
50. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
51. See, e.g., In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
52. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173.
53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
54. E.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 366 (1983); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464 (7th Cir. 1994).
55. E.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 450·51; Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499·500; Hunter,
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legislatively authorized multiple punishments are permissible
under double jeopardy if imposed in a single proceeding, but
impermissible if imposed in successive proceedings. 56 Additionally, the procedural safeguards of the Double Jeopardy
Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties. 57 However, when the government has imposed a criminal
penalty, then seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the government from seeking the second punishment for fear that it
may be motivated by dissatisfaction with the sanction obtained
in the first proceeding. 58

B.

THE UNITED
ANALYSIS

STATES

V.

HALPER

PROPORTIONALITY

Before its decision in United States v. Halper,59 the Supreme Court had never invalidated a legislatively authorized
459 U.S. at 368-69. "The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases
challenging multiple punishments (in the first proceeding) is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater
punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended." Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 697 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in
original).
[T)he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves
principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The
legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the
legislature has acted courts may not impose more than
one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors
ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in
more than one trial.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
56. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69. See also Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937,
1957 n.1 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (in the context of criminal
proceedings); Halper, 490 U.S. at 450 (in the context of civil proceedings).
57. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451. But cf. United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537 (1943) (involving a private party in a qui tam action (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)
(1994» bringing suit on behalf of and in the name of the United States and sharing with the government the proceeds of the action). The Hess Court assumed but
did not decide that a qui tam action could give rise to double jeopardy. Hess, 317
U.S. at 548·49.
58. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10. See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35
(1978) (finding that jeopardy "attaches" at the beginning of a criminal prosecution,
when the jury is empaneled and sworn). See generally Annotation, Conviction from
which Appeal is Pending as a Bar to Another Prosecution for the Same Offense, 61
A.L.R. 2d 1224 (1958).
59. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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successive civil penalty as violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 6o In July 1985, Dr. Irwin Halper was convicted of 65
separate violations of the Criminal False Claims Statute. 61
Each false claim involved a demand for twelve dollars in reimbursement for medical services worth only three dollars per
claim. 62 Dr. Halper was sentenced to imprisonment for two
years and fined $5,000. 63 In a subsequent civil proceeding under the Civil False Claims Act,54 the Government sought to
recover a $2,000 civil penalty for each of the 65 violations. 55
The district court held that a civil penalty more than 220 times
greater than the government's accounted loss lacked the necessary "rational relation" to the government's actual damages to
justify such a penalty.66
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
government's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause only
applied to punishment imposed in criminal proceedings. 67 The
Court determined that the labels "criminal" and "civil" were
not controlling in a double jeopardy inquiry.68 The Court reasoned that while legislative intent is the initial determinant, a
civil statute may be punitive in nature even if it is intended to
be remedia1. 69 The Court stated that "the determination
whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the
relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the
penalty imposed and the purposes that penalty may fairly be

60. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944·45; id. at 1956·57 (Scalia, J., joined
by Thomas, J., dissenting).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988) (which prohibits "mak[ing] or present[ingl ... any
claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof,
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.").
62. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437. Thus, Dr. Halper submitted 65 false Medicare
claims, Dr. Halper overcharged the federal government a total of $585.
63. 1d. at 437.
64. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729·31 (1982 & Supp. II) (which is violated when "[a] person
not a member of an armed forces of the United States . . . (2) knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved." 1d. § 3729(a)(1)). The Act has since been
amended.
65. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 (civil fine totaling $130,000). See also 31 U.S.C. §
3729.
66. Halper, 490 U.S. at 439.
67. 1d. at 441·42.
68. 1d. at 447.
69. 1d. at 447·48.
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said to serve."70 Thus, the Halper Court concluded that the
legislature's description of the Civil False Claims Act as "civil"
did not foreclose the possibility that the sanction may be punitive rather than remedial. 71
The Halper Court then determined that a civil penalty
would be remedial in character if it sought to reimburse the
government for actual costs arising from the defendant's conduct.72 The Court found a "tremendous disparity" between the
government's approximated expenses of $16,000 and Dr.
Halper's liability of $130,000. 73 Because the penalty was
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" in relation to the
government's expenses, the Court reasoned that the penalty
bore no rational relation to the goal of compensating the government. 74 The Halper Court concluded that the penalty constituted a multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because it crossed the line between remedy and
punishment. 75 The Court, however, declined to transform the
penalty into a criminal action with all the attendant constitutional protections. 76

70. Id. at 448.
71. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
72. Id. at 449-50. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court to determine what portion of the penalty ordered pursuant to the
Civil False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31) could be sustained as bearing a
rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its actual loss. Id.
at 452.
"It should be noted that Halper's disproportionality analysis is required only
in those [civil) cases where there has been a separate criminal conviction." In re
Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1311 (1993).
73. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.
74. Id. at 449.
75. See id. at 450. The Court remanded the case to permit the government to
demonstrate that the district court's assessment of its injuries was in error. Id. at
453.
76. See id. at 447. It appears that the Court has drawn a fine line between
when a "civil" penalty constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes and
when a penalty is so punitive that the proceeding necessitates the same constitutional safeguards provided for defendants in traditional prosecutions. For instance,
a criminal defendant has a privilege against self-incrimination and a right to an
indictment by a grand jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Sixth Amendment,
the criminal defendant has the right "to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . , and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process . . . , and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Thus, Halper requires that if a sanction serves only the
goals of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence, that
sanction should be characterized as punishment for purposes of
a double jeopardy analysis. 77 Although the Supreme Court
qualified its ruling as "a rule for the rare case," Halper signified a substantial shift in the Court's application of double
jeopardy jurisprudence. 78
C. MONTANA'S DANGEROUS DRUG TAX ACT

Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Ace9 (hereinafter "the
Act") imposes a tax "on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs.,,8o The tax is collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied. 81 The tax is either
ten percent of the assessed market value of the drugs, or a
specified amount depending on the drug, whichever is great-

77. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. See also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2810 n.12 (1993). Austin broadened the Halper test by incorporating Halper's dicta,
rather than its holding, into its analysis. The explicit holding of Halper was as
follows:
[w)e therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a
criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a
deterrent or retribution.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
However, the Austin Court broadened Halper by emphasizing Halper's dicta:
"it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment ..." Id. at 448 (emphasis added). See generally
Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending
Constitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GoLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1994).
78. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. The Halper Court stated: "[w)hat we announce
now is a rule for the rare case, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages he has caused." Id.
79. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25·101 to ·123 (1987». The Kurth Ranch Court's opinion
refers only to the 1987 edition of the Montana Code, the version in effect at the
time of the Kurths' arrest.
80. Id. § 15·25·111(1).
81. Id. § 15·25·111(3). This section has since been amended at § 15-25-111(1}
(1993). A 1989 amendment substituted "may be collected before" for "must be
collected only after," referring to when the tax can be collected in- relation to the
satisfaction of federal fines and forfeitures.
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er.82 The Act gives the Montana Department of Revenue authority to assess the market value of the drug at issue. sa The
Montana legislature determined that the specified amount of
tax shall be $100 per ounce for marijuana and $250 per ounce
for hashish. 84 At least twenty-six other states tax marijuana
at approximately the same rate. S5 Funds collected from the
Montana Tax are earmarked for youth evaluations, chemical
abuse assessment and aftercare, juvenile detention facilities,
and funding for drug enforcement agencies. 86
According to the Act's preamble, the Montana legislature
recognized "the existence in Montana of a large and profitable
dangerous drug industry .... "S7 While not endorsing illegal
82. Id. § -111(2)(a), (b)(i).
83. Id. § -111(2)(a); id. § -102(2). "There is no unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers to the [Department of Revenue] to make a determination of
market value." In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
84. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25111(2)(b)(i-ii).
85. See ALA. CODE § 40-17A-8(1) (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1203.01
(1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-102(1) (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12651(b)(1) (1993); FLA. STAT. § 212.0505 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-6(1) (Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 63-4203(2)(a) (Supp. 1993); 35 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 520/9(1)
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-1 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 453B.7(1) (Supp.
1994); KAN. S1'AT. ANN. § 79-5202(a)(I) (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:2601(1) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 36, § 4434(1) (Supp.
1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 64K, § 8(1) (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 297D.08(1)
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4303(1)(a) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
372A.070(b)(1) (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18A-3A(5) (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
105-113.107(1) (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-36.1-08(1) (1993); OKLA. STAT., Tit.
68, § 450.2(1) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 44-49-9(1) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED·
LAwS ANN. ch. 10-5OA (1985); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.101(b)(2) (1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-19-103(1)(a) (1992); WIS. STAT. § 139.88(1) (Supp. 1993).
The supreme courts of Florida, Idaho, and South Dakota have found their
states' drug taxing statute to be unconstitutional on their face. See, e.g., State
Dep't of Revenue V. Herre, 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the Florida statute providing for a sales tax on transactions involving marijuana and controlled 8ubstances (FLA. STAT. § 212.0505 (1991) violates the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination); State v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho
1991) (holding that the 1989 version of Idaho's Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act (IDAHO
CODE § 63-4201 et seq. (1989) violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination; but the Smith court noted that the 1990 amended version of the
Act, which added § 63-4206, cured the constitutional deficiency); State V. Roberts,
384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986) (holding that South Dakota's Luxury Tax on
Controlled Substances and Marijuana (S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. ch. 10-50A (1985)
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
86. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25-122(1),
(2).

87. Id. (pmbl.).
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drug enterprises, the legislature concluded that in light of the
economic impact such illegal business has on Montana, "[it is
appropriate] ... to tax those who profit from drug-related
offenses and to dispose of the tax proceeds through providing
additional anti-crime initiatives without burdening law abiding
taxpayers."88 Additionally, the Act authorized the Department
of Revenue to adopt rules to administer and enforce the tax. 89
Acknowledging the practical realities involved in taxing an
illegal activity, the Revenue Department noted that the taxpayer has no obligation to file a return or to pay any tax unless and until he or she is arrested. 90
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

MAJORITY

1.

Halper's Proportionality Test £s Inapplicable to Tax
Statutes

In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,91 the United
States Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's application
of the Halper analysis to the civil tax proceeding instituted
against the Kurths. 92 The Court recognized that in Halper it

88. 1d.
89. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 § 105-25-113(2).
For example, Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1) (1988) provides that the taxpayers
must file a return within 72 hours of their arrest. The rule also provides that law
enforcement personnel shall complete the form and give the taxpayer an opportunity to 8ign it. 1d. R. 42.34.102(3). If the taxpayer refuses to provide a signature,
the rule require8 the officer to file the form within 72 hours of the arrest. 1d. The
Montana Department of Revenue justifies this expedited process because of the
criminal nature of the assessment. See id. R. 42.34.103(3).
90. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-42. Some of the difficulties of taxing
illegal activities include the fact that the taxpayer will not voluntarily identify
himself as subject to the tax due to the illegal nature of the activity. Moreover,
hinging the Montana drug tax on an arrest is necessary to protect the taxpayer's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1)
(1988), which provides that the tax return "shall be filed within 72 hours of ...
arrest," works to protect the taxpayers Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Other taxing schemes, such as purchasing tax stamps, compel the
taxpayer to voluntarily incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
91. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
92. See id. at 1943-45. The Kurth Ranch Court determined that tax statutes,
unlike civil sanctions, are intended to raise revenue and deter conduct, not to
reimburse the government for costs incurred it. See id. at 1945-46.
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determined that a civil penalty may constitute punishment for
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. 93 However, the Supreme Court found a constitutional distinction between a fine
and a tax. 94
The Court observed that civil penalties, criminal fines,
civil forfeitures, and taxes all share certain features which are
subject to constitutional constraints: the raising of government
revenues, imposition of fiscal burdens on individuals, and the
deterrence of certain behavior. 95 However, the Court determined that while penalties, fines, and forfeitures are normally
characterized as sanctions, taxes are distinguishable because
they are generally motivated by revenue-raising rather than
punitive purposes. 96 Tax statutes, unlike civil penalty statutes, need not equate with the government's proven remedial
costS. 97 In light of the unique standing of tax statutes, the
Supreme Court maintained that the proper inquiry in Kurth
Ranch was whether the drug tax had punitive characteristics
that would subject it to the constraints of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 98

2.

Montana's Drug Tax is not Immune from Double Jeopardy
Scrutiny
The Supreme Court began its double jeopardy inquiry by

93. Id. at 1945.
94. Id. at 1945-46. Unlike the civil sanction in Halper, which was intended to

reimburse the government for costs it incurred, tax statutes are intended to raise
revenue and deter conduct. Thus, the Court reasoned, Halper's proportionality
analysis was inapplicable to a tax statute. Id. at 1944-46.
95. Id. at 1945-46. See Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding a defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding). See also,
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (reasoning that a statute imposing
a tax on unlawful conduct may be invalid because its reporting requirements compel taxpayers to incriminate themselves); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(holding a government may not impose criminal fines without first establishing
guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801 (1993) (holding a civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines).
96. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. See also Sorenson v. State Dep't of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29, 32-33 (Mont. 1992).
97. See id.

98. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945-46.
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acknowledging that a State may legitimately tax criminal
activities. 99 The Court noted that, although no double jeopardy challenge was at issue, it had previously upheld a $100-perounce federal tax on marijuana in United States v.
Sanchez. lOo The Kurth Ranch Court suggested that "Montana
no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana,
for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for
the same offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the
same proceeding that resulted in his conviction."lol
The Court recalled that in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,102
it recognized that "there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. "103 The Kurth Ranch
Court then explained that its comment in Magnano Co., when
considered in light of Halper's statement that labels are not
controlling in a double jeopardy inquiry, "indicates that a tax
is not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply because it
is a tax. ,,104

3.

Montana's Drug Tax is Punitive in Nature

The Supreme Court acknowledged that neither a high tax
rate, nor a deterrent purpose, would automatically label the
marijuana tax as punishment. 105 The majority noted that a
99. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994). See
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968) (holding that an activities unlawfulness does not prevent its taxation); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
287, 293 (1935) (holding that illegal activity may be taxed).
100. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47. See United States v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42 (1950) (upholding the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now
repealed (last codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964», which imposed a federal tax on
marijuana at the rate of $100-per-ounce, against a constitutional challenge that
the tax was a penalty, rather than a true tax). The tax at issue was later held to
be unconstitutional in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29 (1969), on the
grounds that it violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
101. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945.
102. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding against a due
process challenge a steep excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on processors of oleomargarine during the Great Depression).
103. Kurth Ranch. 114 S. Ct. at 1946 (citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292
U.S. at 44).
104. [d.
105. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946-47 (1994).
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portion of the assessment against the Kurths was eight times
the drug's market value. lOS Finding this to be a "remarkably
high tax" which "appears to be unrivaled,,,107 the Court analyzed the Act's preamble,108 observing that the legislature apparently intended the drug tax to deter the possession of marijuana. 109 However, aware that it had previously sustained a
$100-per-ounce federal marijuana tax/ 10 and that many valid
taxes "are also both high and motivated to some extent by an
interest in deterrence,,,m the Court held that these features
alone did not render the drug tax punitive. ll2

See also United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
106. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. This portion was the lower-grade marijuana ("shake"). The Revenue Department attempted to tax 100 pounds of shake
at $100-per-ounce for a total tax of $160,000. The Deputy Sheriffs Drug Tax Report valued the shake at $200-per-pound wholesale market' value, resulting in a
tax eight times its market value. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 72 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1990).
107. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 & n.17.
lOB. Id. at 1946 & n.1B. Specifically, the Kurth Ranch Court emphasized the
last section of the preamble which provides:
THEREFORE, the Legislature of the State of Montana
does not wish to give credence to the notion that the
manufacturing, selling, and use of dangerous drugs is
legal or otherwise proper, but finds it appropriate in view
of the economic impact of such drugs to tax those who
profit from drug-related offenses and to dispose of the tax
proceeds through providing additional anticrime initiatives
without burdening law abiding taxpayers.
Id.
109. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47. The Kurth Ranch Court stated:
although the Act's preamble evinces a clear motivation to
raise revenue, it also indicates that the tax will provide
for anticrime initiatives by 'burdening' violators of the law
instead of 'law abiding taxpayers'; that use of dangerous
drugs is not acceptable; and that the Act is not intended
to 'give credence' to any notion that manufacturing, selling, or using drugs is legal or proper.
Id. at n.1a.
110. Id. at 1946-47. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44. The Sanchez Court noted that "[ilt
is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activity taxed." Id.
111. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946. The Kurth Ranch Court referred specifically to taxes on cigarettes and alcohol. For example, the Court acknowledged that
the current 24-cent-per-pack federal tax on cigarettes could, under a new health
plan, be constitutionally increased to 99 cents, resulting in a total tax burden
which surpasses the ao percent rate that Montana imposed on the higher grade
marijuana. Id. at 1946 n.17.
112. Id. at 1946-47.
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Continuing its double jeopardy inquiry, the Supreme Court
considered the Act's "other unusual features" which set it apart
from other taxes.113 The Court noted first that the Montana
tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime, evincing a
penal rather than a revenue-raising intent. 114 The Kurth
Ranch Court then emphasized that the Montana tax was exacted only after the defendant was arrested for the same conduct which gave rise to the tax. U6 Thus, the entire class of
taxpayers subject to the Montana tax is comprised of those
who have been arrested for possessing marijuana. 116
The Court then addressed the Revenue Department's argument that the Montana drug tax is similar to the mixed-motive
"sin" taxes regularly imposed on cigarettes and alcohol. l17 In
distinguishing these taxes from the one at bar, the Court asserted that sin taxes are justified because the products' benefit 11S to society outweigh the products' harm. u9 This high
benefit-to-harm ratio justifies permitting the manufacture of
such products as long as those who buy and sell them pay high
taxes that reduce consumption and bolster government revenues. 120 However, the Court maintained that the justifica-

113. [d. at 1947. The Kurth Ranch Court concluded that the drug tax constitut·
ed punishment because it hinged on the commission of a crime and was levied on
goods the taxpayer never lawfully possessed. [d. at 1947-48.
114. [d. at 1947. The Court emphasized that "this condition is 'significant of
penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.'" (citing United
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (concluding that a tax was moti·
vated by penal instead of revenue· raising intent in part because the taxpayer had
to pay an additional sum based on his illegal conduct». See also Sanchez, 340
U.S. at 45. The Kurth Ranch Court referred to Sanchez as a case in which the
absence of such a condition supported its conclusion that the federal marijuana tax
was a civil rather than criminal sanction. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. The
Federal Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2590(a)(2), now repealed (last codified at
26 U.S.C. §§ 4741), taxed the transfer of marijuana to a person who has not paid
a special tax and registered. Under the statute, the transferor's liability arose
when the transferee failed to pay the tax. The Sanchez Court reasoned that
"[s)ince his tax liability does not in effect rest on criminal conduct, the tax can be
properly called a civil rather than a criminal sanction." Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45.
115. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
116. [d.
117. [d.
118. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court recognized benefits such as creating employ·
ment, satisfying consumer demand, and providing tax revenues.
119. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court did not specify the types of harm products
such as alcohol and cigarettes inflict on society.
120. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
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tions for sin taxes "vanish when the taxed activity is completely forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that
might support such a tax could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction. »121
Lastly, the Supreme Court found the Montana tax unusual
because although it purported to be a tax on "the possession
and storage of dangerous drugs,» it was levied on goods the
taxpayer never lawfully possessed. 122 Because statutes which
amount to a confiscation of property have been held unconstitutional,123 the Court reasoned that "a tax on previously confiscated goods is at least questionable.»124
Concluding its analysis, the Supreme Court found
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax to be "too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis. »125 The Court therefore held that the tax constituted
a second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause and "must be imposed during the first prosecution or
not at all.»126 The Court added that the civil tax proceeding
initiated by Montana against the Kurths was the "functional
equivalent" of a second criminal prosecution in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 127

121. [d.
122. [d. at 1948.
123. [d. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (holding a federal gift
tax to be so "arbitrary and capricious" as to cause it to violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Bee aLBo Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927)
(holding a federal estate tax to be "arbitrary and capricious" and thus violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
124. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. Noting that the State destroyed the
marijuana crop before assessing the tax against the Kurths, the Court determined
that the tax had a definite punitive character. The Kurth Ranch Court stated: "[a)
tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an unmistakable punitive character. This tax, imposed on criminals and no others, departs so far from normal revenue laws as to become a form
of punishment." [d.
125. [d.
126. [d.
127. [d. The Kurth Ranch Court did not expand on this statement, nor did it
clarify whether the Montana drug tax proceeding, regardless of when initiated,
required all of the criminal-procedure guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Courts' statement that "Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the
possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpay-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist

349

In dissent,128 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
Kurth Ranch represents the first time the Court subjected a
tax statute to a double jeopardy inquiry.129 The Chief Justice
supported the Court's decision to abandon the Ninth Circuit's
application of the Halper mode of analysis to the Montana
drug tax. 130 However, the Chief Justice maintained that after
properly refuting the Halper analysis, the Court then implemented "a hodgepodge of criteria - many of which have been
squarely rejected by our previous decisions - to be used in
deciding whether a tax statute qualifies as 'punishment.'"13l
Chief Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the Court's presumption that a high tax rate combined with a deterrent purpose "lend support" to the view of the drug tax as punishment. 132 Citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton/ 33 Sonzinsky v.
United States,134 and United States v. Sanchez,135 the Chief
er for the same offense ... ," when contrasted with the Court's statement that
the drug tax "was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution ... ," only exacerbates this uncertainty. 1d. at 1945, 1948.
128. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-60 (1994)
(dissenting opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J.).
129. 1d. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. 1d. In agreement with the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Halper "says nothing about
the possible double jeopardy concerns of a tax, as opposed to a civil fine . . . ." 1d.
131. 1d. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506
United States v.
(1937); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950);
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934);
See infra notes 133-36, 142-44 for the holdings of the above decisions.
132. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding against a due process challenge a steep
excise tax imposed by the State of Washington on processors of oleomargarine
during the Great Depression).
134. 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding an annual federal firearms tax as a valid
exercise of the taxing power of Congress). The Sonzinsky Court noted that "it has
long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an
exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome
or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed." [d. at 513.
135. 340 U.S. 42 (1950). The Sanchez Court stated that "lilt is beyond serious
question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activity taxed." 1d. at 44.
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Justice concluded that it is firmly established that a
burdensomely high tax rate or outright deterrent purpose are
not fatal to a tax's validity.13s
Next, the Chief Justice criticized the discussion of "other
unusual features" of the Montana drug tax. l37 The majority
noted that the Montana tax was conditioned on the commission
of a crime and exacted only after arrest.13S The Chief Justice
argued that this characteristic merely reflected the practical
realities involved in the process of taxing illegal drug enterprises. l39 The illegal status of the taxed activity prevents taxpayers from voluntarily identifying themselves as subject to
the tax. 140
Chief Justice Rehnquist then considered the majority's
statement that the justifications for mixed-motive "sin" taxes
vanished when the taxed activity was illegal. l4l The Chief
Justice found that statement contradicted the findings in Marchetti v. United States/ 42 United States v. Constantine/43
and James v. United States. 144 According to Chief Justice
136. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist then asserted that this case law applied to the Montana drug
statute because under Marchetti and Constantine illegal activity may be taxed. ld.
(citing Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 44 (holding that an activities unlawfulness does not
prevent its taxation»; Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293 (holding that illegal activity
may be taxed). The Constantine Court explained that "Itlhe burden of lal tax may
be imposed alike on the just and the unjust. It would be strange if one carrying
on a business the subject of an excise should be able to excuse himself from payment by the plea that in carrying on the business he was violating the law." ld.
137. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
138. ld. at 1947.
139. ld. at 1950. Some of the difficulties of taxing illegal activities include the
fact that the taxpayer will not voluntarily identify himself as subject to the tax
due to the illegal nature of the activity. Moreover, hinging the Montana drug tax
on an arrest is necessary to protect the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self- incrimination. Other taxing schemes, such as purchasing tax stamps,
compel the taxpayer to voluntarily incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. See id at 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. ld. at 1950 n.2. It should be added that Mont. Admin. R. 42.34.102(1)
(1988), which provides that the tax return "shall be filed within 72 hours of . . .
arrest," works to protect the taxpayers Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.
141. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding that an activities unlawfulness does not prevent its taxation).
143. 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (holding that illegal activity may be taxed).
144. 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (holding that any monetary gain from illegal activity
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Rehnquist, the majority overemphasized the fact that the portion of the assessment imposed on the lower-grade marijuana
was eight times the drug's market value,145 when the tax imposed on the higher grade marijuana amounted to only 80
percent of its market value. 146 The Chief Justice stressed that
the relevant inquiry in Kurth Ranch should be whether the tax
rate is so high that it can only be characterized as serving a
punitive purpose. 147 Chief Justice Rehnquist then compared
the Montana drug tax with sin taxes on legal products such as
alcohol and cigarettes, arguing the respective tax rates are not
so dissimilar as to invalidate the drug tax. 14S The Chief Justice indicated that the difference was justified because the
drug tax was the only tax collected from individuals engaged in
the illegal drug business, and the vast majority of the profitable underground drug enterprises would escape taxation altogether. 149
Lastly, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the majority's
finding that the Montana drug tax was "unusual" because it
was assessed on drugs that the Kurths neither owned nor
possessed at the time of taxation. 150 He found it inconceivable
that in order to tax the Kurths it would be necessary to return
the illegal drugs to their possession. 151 In analyzing the preconstituted taxable income). See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
145. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
majority merely footnotes the fact that the tax imposed on the higher quality
marijuana amounted to only 80 percent of the product's market value. In the same
footnote, the Court then averaged the effective tax rates on the two grades of
marijuana, resulting in a tax rate of four times the market value. [d. at 1946
n.17.
146. [d. at 1951-52.
147. [d. at 1952.
148. [d. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at the current 24-centsper-pack federal tax on cigarettes under 26 U.S.C. § 5701(b) (1994). Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that "[wlhile this does not exceed the cost of a pack of cigarettes, the current proposal to boost the cigarette tax to 99 cents per pack could
lead to a total tax on cigarettes in some jurisdictions at a rate higher than the
80% rate utilized in this case for the marijuana bud." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
1937, 1952 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
149. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ..
150. [d. at 1951.
151. [d. Cf, Constantine, 296 U.S. at 293, stating "lilt would be strange if one
carrying on a business the subject of an excise should be able to excuse himself
from payment by the plea that in carrying on the business he was violating the
law."
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amble to the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act,152 the Chief
Justice looked beyond its description as a tax on "storage and
possession," and determined that the Act was passed for the
legitimate purpose of raising revenue from the illicit drug
industry. 153
Although he conceded that an assessment denominated a
"tax" could, "under some conceivable circumstances, constitute
'punishment'" under the Double Jeopardy Clause/54 Chief
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that such was not the case in this
context. 155 The Chief Justice concluded that because
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax had the legitimate non-penal
purpose of increasing government revenue, and the valid purpose of deterring criminal conduct, it did not violate double
jeopardy.156
2.

Justice O'Connor

In dissent, Justice O'Connor felt that Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax should be subject to double jeopardy scrutiny.157 However, unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's finding that the Halper proportionality
analysis controlled. 158 She reasoned there was no "constitutional distinction" between a civil penalty and a tax. 159
In light of the Halper decision Justice O'Connor determined that the central inquiry was whether Montana's drug
152. Dangerous Drug Tax Act, ch. 563 1987 Mont. Laws 1416 (codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987)(pmbl.).
153. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist made this determination "[altter reviewing the structure and
language [as well as the purpose and effect) of the tax provision and comparing
the rate of taxation with similar types of sin taxes imposed on lawful products ..." ld. at 1952.
154. ld. at 1951.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1952. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the tax was
nonpunitive in nature and therefore not an independent "jeopardy." Id.
157. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. ld. at 1953-55. Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
application of the Halper proportionality analysis, she argued that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Halper's analysis.
159. Id. at 1953.
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tax was punitive. 160 Applying the Halper analysis,161 she
maintained that the Kurths must first have shown that the
amount of the assessment bore no rational relationship to the
state's nonpunitive objectives. 162 If the Kurths met this requirement, the burden would shift to the state to justify the
tax by way of an accounting of its actual 10ss.163 Justice
O'Connor therefore concluded that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals improperly placed the burden of an accounting on the
state before the Kurths had shown a lack of a rational relationship between the amount of the tax and the state's
nonpunitive objectives. l64
Justice O'Connor noted that the majority avoided the issue
of the Ninth Circuit's error by holding the Halper proportionality analysis inapplicable to taxes. 165 The Montana drug tax
should be viewed as a rough remedial surrogate for the costs of
apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating the Kurths. 166

160. Id. For Justice O'Connor, if imposition of the tax was a punishment, the
tax assessment would require a second criminal proceeding prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. That is, if the tax proceeding truly inflicted punishment in the traditional sense, the proceeding would require the criminal procedural protections
provided to defendants in criminal prosecutions. (It does not appear that Justice
O'Connor distinguished between punishment violative of double jeopardy and punishment which necessitates a criminal proceeding with all the attendant constitutional safeguards). See HARv. L. REV., supra note 18, at 175 n.37.
161. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[W]hether an exaction is punitive entails a two-part inquiry: . . . [1] the defendant must first show the absence of
a rational relationship between the amount of the sanction and the government's nonpunitive objectives; [2] the
burden then shifts to the government to justify the sanction with reference to the particular case.
Id.
162. Id. at 1954-55.
163. Id. at 1954.
164. Id. at 1954-55. Justice O'Connor stated that every state statute is entitled
to a presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, in the double jeopardy context, "a
sanction denominated as civil must be presumed to be nonpunitive. This presumption would be rendered nugatory if the government were required to prove that
the sanction is in fact nonpunitive before imposing it in a particular case." Id.
165. Id. at 1955.
166. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1953-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The consequences of this decision are astounding. The
State of Montana-along with about half of the other
States-is now precluded from ever imposing the drug tax
on a person who has been punished for a possessory drug
offense. A defendant who is arrested, tried, and convicted
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Finally, Justice O'Connor urged that the majority's decision
was "entirely unnecessary to preserve individual liberty," because the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause167
limits the extent of legislated punishments. l68

3.

Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas)

In dissent, Justice Scalia disputed the majority's "belief
that there is a multiple-punishments component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.,,169 While acknowledging that many cases
have stated that the clause protects against successive punishments for the same criminal offense,170 Justice Scalia countered that "the repetition of a dictum does not turn it into a
holding."l7l Justice Scalia asserted that the Double Jeopardy
for possession of one ounce of marijuana cannot be taxed
$100 therefore, even though the State's law enforcement
costs in such a case average more than $4,000.
[d. at 1955.
Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[tlhe State and Federal Governments
spend vast sums on drug control activities . . . (approximately $27 billion in fiscal
year 1991). The Kurths are directly responsible for some of these expenditures . . .
apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of the Kurths will cost the State of
Montana at least $120,000." [d. at 1953·54 (parenthetical in original). Justice
O'Connor concluded that "today's decision will be felt acutely by law.abiding tax·
payers, because it will seriously undermine the ability of the State and Federal
Governments to collect recompense for the immense costs criminals impose on our
society." [d. at 1955. See also United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.
1994) (summarizing various sources which estimate that illegal drug sales produce
approximately $80 to $100 billion per year while exacting $60 to $120 billion per
year in costs to the government and society).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
168. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See id. at
1958 n.2 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Alexander v.
United States, ll3 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), is the first Supreme Court case to apply
the Excessive Fines Clause to criminaVin personam proceedings); Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civ·
Win rem forfeiture proceedings). See also Browning.Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
492 U.S. 257, 283·84 (1989) (discussing incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause
and holding that the clause does not apply to punitive damages).
169. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1955·60 (1994)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. [d. See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498·99 (1984); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173
(1874) .
171. Kurth Ranch, ll4 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dis·
senting). In his dissent in Kurth Ranch, Justice Scalia argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a
defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have a nonremedial civil
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Clause as first put forth by the Framers of the Fifth Amendment did not contemplate the prohibition of multiple punish. ments. 172 In Justice Scalia's view: "'[t]o be put in jeopardy'
does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its terms this
provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions."173 According to Justice Scalia, the reliance
on a no-multiple-punishments rule must derive solely from the
due process requirement that cumulative punishments be authorized by the legislature. 174 In support of this contention

penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate proceeding), "was
in error." [d. at 1958.
172. [d. at 1955-57. Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Frankfurter's reasoning
in United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943):
For legislation . . . providing two sanctions for the same
misconduct, enforceable in separate proceedings, one a
conventional criminal prosecution, and the other a forfeiture proceeding or a civil action as upon a debt, was
quite common when the Fifth Amendment was framed by
Congress. . . . It would do violence to proper regard for
the framers of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they
contemporaneously enacted and continued to enact legislation that was offensive to the guarantees of the double
jeopardy clause which they had proposed for ratification.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-56 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring».
173. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. [d. at 1956-57. Justice Scalia traced "[t)he belief that there is a multiplepunishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause" to Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined
by Thomas, J., dissenting).
In that case, the lower court sentenced Lange to both one
year of imprisonment and a $200 fine for stealing mail
bags from the Post Office, under a statute that authorized
a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment or a
fine not to exceed $200. The Court, acknowledging that
the sentence was in excess of statutory authorization,
issued a writ of habeas corpus. Lange has since been
cited as though it were decided exclusively on the basis of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, and n.11; in fact, Justice
Miller's opinion for the Court rested the decision on . . .
both the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment. See Lange, 18 Wall. at 170, 176, 178.
The opinion went out of its way not to rely exclusively on
the Double Jeopardy Clause, in order to avoid deciding
whether it applied to prosecutions not literally involving
'life or limb.' See id. at 170. It is clear that the Due
Process Clause alone suffices to support the decision,
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Justice Scalia noted that until Halper the Court had never
struck down a legislatively authorized successive punishment. 175
Before Halper, Justice Scalia explained, the validity of the
no-multiple-punishments rule was of little importance because
the Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on successive criminal prosecutions rendered irrelevant any consideration of successive
punishments. 176 In addition, he argued that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses have been
available to protect criminals from unrestricted multiple punishment. 177 Furthermore, civil proceedings subsequent to
criminal prosecutions were not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause even if they had the potential to impose penalties. 17s
Justice Scalia noted that when the Halper Court extended the
no-multiple-punishments restriction to civil penalties, the rule
experienced an unwarranted expansion. 179

since the guarantee of the process provided by the law of
the land assures prior legislative authorization for whatever punishment is imposed.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
175. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
176. [d. at 1957. Justice Scalia pointed out that "the Double Jeopardy Clause's
ban on successive criminal prosecutions would make surplusage of any distinct
protection against additional punishment imposed in a successive prosecution, since
the prosecution itself would be barred." [d.
177. [d. at 1958-59. The Eighth Amendment provides that "Ielxcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Justice Scalia emphasized that "the Due Process Clause keeps punishment within the bounds established by the legislature,
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses place substantive limits upon what these legislated bounds may be." Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. 1937, 1958 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stressed
that "Imlultiple punishment is . . . restricted by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause insofar as its nature is concerned, and by the Excessive Fines
Clause insofar as its cumulative extent is concerned." [d. at 1959.
178. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). In support of his argument, Justice Scalia relied on United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) (holding a gun owner's acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in
rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms), and One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1972) (holding a forfeiture of imported
merchandise is not barred by a prior acquittal).
179. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Convinced that Halper "was in error," Justice Scalia anticipated the social
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Justice Scalia also criticized the majority's statement that
the tax proceeding initiated by Montana was "the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the
Kurths in jeopardy a second time" for the same offense. 180
Justice Scalia criticized that statement for its implicit assumption that any proceeding that inflicts punishment, in the context of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is a criminal prosecution. 1s1 Justice Scalia reasoned that if the Court accurately

costs of following "the fictional, Halper.created multiple-punishments prohibition,"
such as offenders avoiding criminal punishment because a civil penalty has already
been imposed on them. [d. at 1958-59. Justice Scalia reasoned that "if there is a
constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments, the order of punishment cannot
possibly make any difference." ld. at 1958. Since Justice Scalia wrote his dissent
in Kurth Ranch, a number of courts have grappled with the notion of disallowing
criminal punishment because a civil sanction has already been imposed. In the
recent United States District Court case, United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp.
1299 (W.D. Wash. 1994), for example, defendant McCaslin's criminal sentence was
vacated on double jeopardy grounds. The Court held that because the government
had already completed a civil forfeiture of McCaslin's residence, his criminal sentence constituted a second punishment for the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. ld. at 1307.
180. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948).
181. ld. Justice Scalia found that the Court's assumption parted with a number
of cases, including Halper. ld. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938), stating that:
[f1orfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of
fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which
have been recognized as enforceable [sic) by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789. In spite of
their comparative severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions.
ld. (citation omitted).
While acknowledging that Kennedy and Ward may appear to support the
majority's assumption, Justice Scalia distinguished the case at bar. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). In Mendoza·
Martinez, the Court stated the seven criteria traditionally applied to determine
whether a particular Act of Congress is civil or criminal:
[w)hether the sanction involves an .affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
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concluded that the civil tax proceeding criminally punished the
Kurths, it would not only be proscribed by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but by the criminal procedure protections of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments,l82 The proceeding would therefore be struck down whether or not it had been preceded by
the criminal prosecution,l8S Thus, Justice Scalia concluded,
the majority contradicted itself when it asserted both that the
tax proceeding would be "lawful in isolation"184 and that the

assigned are all relevant to the inquiry . . . .
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
The Ward Court, in determining whether an Act of Congress was civil or criminal,
declared:
[o)ur inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on
two levels. First, we have set out to determine whether
Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one
label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated
an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired
further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. In
regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted that 'only the
clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground.'
[d. at 248-49, quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (citations
omitted). "In making this [second) determination, . . . refer to the seven considerations listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, 372 U.S., at 168-69." Ward,
448 U.S. at 249.
Justice Scalia noted that the criteria used in Kennedy and Ward to determine whether proceedings are civil or criminal were more stringent than the criteria applied in Halper. Justice Scalia explained that Halper's retribution and deterrence test was just one factor in the Kennedy-Ward "criminal prosecution" test.
Justice Scalia reasoned it was precisely the difficulty in meeting the criminal prosecution test which prompted the Halper Court to turn to the multiple-punishments
analysis. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
182. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). For instance, a criminal defendant has a privilege against self-incrimination and a right to an indictment by a grand jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under
the Sixth Amendment, the criminal defendant has the right "to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . , and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process . . . , and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argues that if the tax proceeding was criminal in nature, it
would require the constitutional protections afforded a defendant in criminal prosecutions, regardless of the order the proceeding was instituted.
184. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is referring to the Court's assertion that "Montana no
doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana, for example, if it had
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proceeding was "the functional equivalent"185 of a second
criminal prosecution. 188
Finally, Justice Scalia found that the Kurths were not
subjected to a second criminal prosecution.187 Because the
drug tax and criminal penalties were legislatively authorized,
the tax satisfied that principle of due process mistakenly referred to as the multiple-punishments component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 188
V. CONCLUSION

Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch 189 marks an expansion of double jeopardy jurisprudence into civil tax proceedings. In this case of first impression, the Supreme Court considered whether a civil tax proceeding commenced during a
criminal prosecution for the same offense, the possession and
storage of dangerous drugs, ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
concluded that it did.
The majority concluded that the "unusual" features of
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act set the statute apart from
most taxes. Specifically, the majority noted that Montana's tax
hinged on the commission of a crime, was levied on goods the

not previously punished the taxpayer for the same offense ...." 1d. at 1945.
185. 1d. at 1948.
186. 1d. at 1960. "In fact, the Court's conclusion that the Montana tax assessment was the 'functional equivalent' of a criminal proceeding may sub silentio
overrule the more stringent &nnedy-Ward test . . . for determining if a proceeding is criminal." HARv. L. REv., supra note 19, at 177-78 n.53 (1994) "The
m~ority's judicial back-pedaling into multiple-prosecutions jurisprudence suggests
the Court may be uncomfortable with its own multiple-punishments analysis and
is another 'characteristic signO of doctrinal senility.... 1d. at 177-78 (quoting Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 264 (1965».
187. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia came to this conclusion after applying the Kennedy-Ward
"criminal prosecution" test to the Kurths' tax proceeding.
188. 1d. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, this 'legislative authorization' protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause was originally found only in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 1d. at 1958-60.
189. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (per
Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.; dissenting
opinions by Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, J.; and Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.).
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taxpayer never lawfully possessed, was assessed at eight times
the market value of the property taxed, and was partly motivated by an interest in deterrence. Given these unusual characteristics, the majority concluded that the tax was properly
characterized as punishment and thus violated the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.
In dissent in Kurth Ranch, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
that the majority failed to provide a clear test for determining
when a tax constitutes punishment in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Chief Justice found the factors enunciated by the majority to be "a hodgepodge of criteria - many
of which have been squarely rejected by our previous decisions
• • • "190 Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that the Halper
proportionality analysis should apply to civil tax proceedings,
and that under such analysis, the Montana tax should be
viewed as remedial. Finally, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, argued in dissent that the Fifth Amendment as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution did not prohibit
multiple punishments for the same offense, thus the Montana
tax should have been upheld.

Tad Ravazzini"
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